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THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE:
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v. SMITH'S
INEXPLICABLE DEPARTURE FROM
THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
The first amendment to the United States Constitution' seeks to
preserve the free exercise of all religions as a basic liberty.' In-
U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ... ." Id.
2 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), reprinted in T.
JEmEsoN 13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER SON 442 (1956). In his letter to Madison, Jeffer-
son was gratified by the acceptance of the Constitution, but insisted on the need for a bill
of rights including the freedom of religion in all cases. Id. Madison, the author of the first
amendment, supported Jefferson in the need for a bill of rights which would protect indi-
vidual religious and civil rights in order to prevent the oppression of minority beliefs. Let-
ter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERtSON 278 (1955). Omission of a bill of rights from the body of the Constitu-
tion resulted in strong opposition to that document leading to the embodiment of individ-
ual protections such as the free exercise of religion in the Constitution's amendments. Let-
ters of the Federal Farmer by R.H. Lee, reprinted in PAMPHLTs ON THE CoNsTrrunON OF
THE UNrTED STATES 315 (1968).
The Supreme Court initially interpreted first amendment guarantees protecting the free
exercise of religion in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). Chief Justice Waite
quoted Thomas Jefferson's rationale in support of an express declaration in the Constitu-
tion to insure religious freedom:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should 'make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion],' thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights
of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments
which tend to restore man to his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in
opposition to his social duties.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (quoting 8 JEFF. Wostts 113 (1788)). The Court has continued to
support the framers' intent to preserve the free exercise of religious beliefs. See, e.g.,
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). The Cantwell Court determined that
"[flreedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law." Id. at 303. The Court
later reaffirmed that "[the freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute." See
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
The Reynolds Court found it necessary to define what was intended by the framers of the
Constitution to be a religion. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162. The Court addressed the issue
by defining the guarantee of religious freedom. Id. Today, the issue of defining religion is
still relevant and the task of determining what is a religious belief or practice is very diffi-
cult. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). See, e.g., United States v. Sun
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tending to safeguard the free expression of religious beliefs and
opinions from government interference,3 the framers created one
of the most precious freedoms found in our democratic society."
Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1227 (2d Cir. 1983) (court defined religion as "feelings, acts,
and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to
stand in relation to whatever they consider the divine" (quoting W. JAMs, THE VARIEaIEs
OF REuGtous EXPERIENcE 31 (1910))), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984); Lupu, Where Rights
Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARv. L. REV. 933, 957
(1989) ("Theologians, sociologists, ... and others have struggled mightily with definitional
questions, but have hardly approached anything resembling agreement on what constitutes
religion or religious belief."). See generally UnderkufRer, "Discrimination" on the Basis of
Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv.
581, 600-03 (1989) (statutory definitions of religion not consistent); Comment, Brave New
World Revisited: Fifteen Years of Chemical Sacraments, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 879, 914-25 (1980)
[hereinafter Comment, Brave New World) (legal definitions of religion which have received
first amendment protections).
' See T. JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE PORTAsLE THOMAS
JEFFERSoN 251-53 (1975). A bill for establishing religious freedom was drafted by Jefferson
in 1777, brought forward by James Madison in 1785, and enacted by the State of Virginia
in 1786. Id. at 251. The enacted statute stated:
We the General Assembly of Virginia do enact that no man shall be compelled to
frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall
be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall oth-
erwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be
free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion,
and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
Id. at 253. James Madison based the first amendment's free exercise clause on the Virginia
statute. See I. BRwr, JAMES MADISON THE NATIONALIST 1780-1787 350, 354-55 (1948).
Thomas Jefferson, as an advocate of religious freedom, further acknowledged the dis-
tinction between religious beliefs and religious practices when he asserted: "Believing with
you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; I contemplate with
. ..reverance [the] .. .Act. . .that [thel. . .legislature should 'make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise therof,'...." Reynolds, 98
U.S. at 164 (quoting 8 Jm. WORKS 113 (1788)). By recognizing this distinction between
opinion and action, Jefferson actually established a distinction between the church and the
state. See id. at 163. James Madison also supported the separation of church and state and
indicated that religion was not within the "cognizance of civil government" in his Memo-
rial and Remonstrance. Id.
' See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), reprinted in 13 T.
JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (1956). Jefferson, as well as the other
framers, saw religious freedom as a fundamental human right needing to be preserved:
"(In] call[ing] for a bill of rights... [iut seems pretty generally understood that this should
go to Juries, Habeas corpus, Standing armies, Printing, Religion, and Monopolies .... The
few cases wherein these things may do evil, cannot be weighed against the multitude
wherein the want of them will do evil." Id. Madison, in his Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments recognized that the right of every man to exercise religion
as his own conscience may dictate is " 'unalienable... because what is here a right towards
men, is a duty towards the Creator'-a duty older and deeper than the claims of civil soci-
ety." See I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON THE NATIONALIST 1780-1787 350 (1948) (quoting James
Madison, Writings, II, 183-191). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 413 (1963)
(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart was convinced that "no liberty is more essential to
the continued vitality of the free society . . . than is the religious liberty protected by the
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Nonetheless, when religious practices, rather than beliefs,8 have
conflicted with government interests, 6 courts have historically con-
formed first amendment free exercise rights with mainstream
values.7
Free Exercise Clause .... I" d. (Stewart, J., concurring). In Braunfeld, Justice Brennan also
described religious freedom as a preeminent societal value. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). This religious freedom was of
such great importance that the framers devoted the Constitution's first amendment to pro-
tecting that liberty. Comment, First Americans and the First Amendment: American Indians
Battle for Religious Freedom, 13 S. ILL U.L. Rlv. 945, 973 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, First
Americans].
I E.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), reprinted in T.
JEFFERSON. 13 THE PAPERS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 442-43 (1956). "The declaration that reli-
gious faith shall be unpunished, does not give impunity to criminal acts dictated by reli-
gious error." Id. "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Reynolds, 98
U.S. at 166. "[T]he [First] Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be."
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
The Supreme Court has distinguished between religious beliefs and religious practices
and their treatment. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (distinction drawn
between freedom of religious belief, which is absolute, and freedom of religious conduct,
which is not); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972) (all religious beliefs are
free from state control, but not all religious conduct is so protected by first amendment).
See generally supra note 3 (discussion of framers' intent to safeguard religious beliefs, rather
than religious actions).
I See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or sub-
versive of good order." Id. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida,
480 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1987) (denial of unemployment benefits where employee was fired
for refusal to work on Sabbath held violative of free exercise clause of first amendment);
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (conviction of Amish for violating compulsory school-attendance law
held unconstitutional under free exercise clause); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 600-01 (Pennsylva-
nia's Sunday Closing Law imposed financial disadvantages on members of Jewish faith if
they continued to observe Saturday Sabbath); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301-02 (Connecticut
law prohibiting solicitation of money for religious purposes interfered with Jehovah Wit-
ness' distribution of literature).
I See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 14-13, at 1270 (1988). "States often
pursue-and the Court has often accepted as compelling-what might be termed diffuse
societal interests. Many such goals, which seemed proper and fundamental in a religiously
homogeneous society, now seem more dubious-particularly when the goal is defined to
forbid any exemptions." Id. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986)
(majority view does not entertain wearing of religious apparel with military uniforms even
though contradictory to minority religious belief); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261
(1981) (mainstream values dictate that public policy must prevail where minority religious
practices are burdened incidentally); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961) (major-
ity religious values influenced state's determination of day of rest, although it indirectly.
burdened minority beliefs); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 334 (1890) (minority religious
marital practices upheld as crimes by government influenced by majority religious beliefs).
Cf. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224. "A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no
rights or interest of others is not to be condemned because it is different." Id. But see
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The breadth of first amendment free exercise guarantees was
first shaped in 1879 when the United States Supreme Court dis-
tinguished religious belief from religious conduct.' The Court
created an exception to the free exercise clause by endorsing Con-
gress' right to regulate social conduct in the interest of public wel-
fare, even where conduct might be advocated or proscribed by
religious belief.' The Court reaffirmed this narrow approach in
1940,10 and simultaneously extended first amendment rights to
citizens of every state through the application of the fourteenth
amendment.1
Throughout subsequent case law, involving practically every as-
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 411 (Douglas, J., concurring). "[Miany people hold beliefs alien to the
majority of our society-beliefs that are protected by the First Amendment but which
could easily be trod upon under the guise of 'police' or 'health' regulations reflecting the
majority's views." Id. "[Tlhe law that has emerged thus far creates an intolerable risk of
discrimination against unconventional religious practices and beliefs, and threatens to nar-
row the protection of religious liberty overall." Lupu, supra note 2, at 936. "Court[s]
should not be swayed by the strangeness of... beliefs, but should be guided by the princi-
ple that the unorthodox character of beliefs must not deprive... [individuals] of the pro-
tections of the free exercise clause." Comment, First Americans, supra note 4, at 969.
0 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879). Reynolds marked the first
time that the Court limited free exercise of religion. Id. at 165. The Court limited religious
practices to the extent that those practices came within the sphere of criminal conduct. Id.
at 166-67. "To [otherwise] permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of reli-
gious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become
a law unto himself." Id. at 167. See also supra notes 3, 4 & 5 (religious beliefs were deter-
mined to be protected under first amendment, while religious conduct was not).
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. The Reynolds Court created the exception by concluding
that the statute prohibiting polygamy was within the legislative power of Congress, and was
both constitutional and valid. Id. See also supra notes 3-5 (statutes in interest of public wel-
fare were deemed to take precedence over certain religious conduct).
'0 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (Cantwell Court reaffirmed
Reyolds and emphasized that conduct remains subject to regulation for protection of
society).
11 US. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at
303. The Cantwell Court linked the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantees with
the guaranteed liberties of the first amendment, thus applying first amendment limitations
to state statutes. Id. See generally Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (first amendment's
applicability to states by reason of fourteenth amendment prohibits state and federal gov-
ernments from making laws inhibiting free exercise of religion); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 113-16 (1943) (fourteenth amendment makes first amendment applicable to
states); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (freedoms of first amendment
are protected from federal abridgment and are similarly protected from state abridgment
through fourteenth amendment).
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pect of daily life,'" the Supreme Court oscillated by both strength-
ening and weakening free exercise rights' 8 and by creating a pro-
tected, yet exclusive, sanctuary for religious belief. 4 Prior to the
1960's, the Court moved to immunize religious belief from state
regulation, while simultaneously allowing the states to prevail
when those regulations conflicted with religious conduct. 5 Subse-
's See generally Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 110 S.
Ct. 688 (1990) (state sales tax on religious materials does not contravene religion clauses of
first amendment); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (first amendment did not
prohibit application of military dress regulation restricting wearing of religious apparel by
servicemen); Jensen, Director, Dep't of Motor Vehicles of Nebraska v. Quaring, 472 U.S.
478 (1985) (state law requiring photo on driver's license unconstitutionally burdened sin-
cerely held religious belief); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (state license
plate slogan violated citizens' free exercise rights); School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S.
203, 225-26 (1963) (Bible reading in public school violated free exercise clause); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (free exercise rights burdened by denial of unemploy-
ment benefits after dismissal for religiously motivated refusal to work Saturdays); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 804 (1944) (state law protecting minors from selling religious peri-
odicals in public place was upheld despite its infringement on proselytizing practices of
religious sect); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (free
exercise of religion is violated where state compels flag salute in public schools).
1s Compare Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 146
(1987) (Court upheld first amendment rights over state law denying unemployment bene-
fits due to employee's refusal to work on Sabbath) and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana,
450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (first amendment protected employee's right to receive unem-
ployment benefits after termination for refusal to work on job contradicting his religious
beliefs) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (free exercise clause prevailed
over state's compulsory school attendance law) with Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595, 1606 (1990) (state's interest in controlling substance abuse under criminal statute
prevailed over first amendment rights of Native American church members to practice
ceremony central to their religious beliefs) and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-
tective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 454-58 (1988) (state's right to build road through state forest
upheld over Native Americans' right to preserve sacred sites) and Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 711-12 (1986) (state's interest in preventing fraudulent receipt of entitlement benefits
restricted practice of parent's religious belief that use of social security number for their
daughter's benefits would harm her spirit).
1 See, e.g., supra note 5 (cases representative of notion that first amendment affords ab-
solute protection for religious beliefs). See also supra note 12 (cases suggesting absolute
protection in daily life for religious beliefs, while imposing limitations on some religious
conduct). Cf Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 US.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2 (1982)
(Act provides in part that "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer...
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual... because of such individual's...
religion"); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469
(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)) (Act extends first amendment protections to
Native American religions). See generally Underkuffier, supra note 2, at 581 (employment
protection of religious free exercise applied to states by fourteenth amendment).
16 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (upheld Reynolds' be-
lief-conduct dichotomy, holding freedom of religious belief as absolute, but allowing regu-
lation of public preaching); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-48 (1890) (Court re-empha-
sized state's inability to regulate Mormon religious belief, while at same time prohibiting
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quently, however, some forms of religious conduct were shielded
from government regulations16 when the Court chose to impose a
strict scrutiny standard of review.17 This strict scrutiny standard
has most consistently been applied where religious conduct con-
flicted with state employment regulations." Recently, however,
the Supreme Court digressed from this standard in an employ-
ment regulation case, Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith."
In Smith, respondents, Alfred Smith and Galen Black were ter-
minated from their employment as drug rehabilitation counselors
with a private drug rehabilitation agency20 because of their use of
practice of polygamy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1879) (first Court
definition of free exercise protections, which limited protection to religious beliefs while
allowing states to regulate conduct).
is See, e.g., Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 146 (religious convert's post-employment Sabbath obser-
vance protected); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 709, 720 (religiously motivated refusal to work on
military project secured); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36 (1972) (Amish right to home educate
their children after eighth grade preserved); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410 (employee's refusal
to work on Sabbath deemed protected from employer regulation).
.1 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Justice
Stone suggested a standard for a higher level of scrutiny stating: "There may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
14th." Id.
In the 1960's, the Court moved to implement a stricter standard of review, resulting in
the immunization of some forms of religious conduct. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398. Sherbert
marked the first Court advocacy of religious conduct in the employment situation through
the utilization of a strict scrutiny test. Id. The Court had previously laid the foundation for
the strict scrutiny test, although it had upheld the state statute. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 606-07 (1961).
is See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 196, 146
(1987) (denial of unemployment benefits to religious convert held violative of free exercise
clause under strict scrutiny standard); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana, 450 U.S. 707,
718-20 (1981) (state's denial of unemployment benefits to Jehovah's Witness who left em-
ployment after transfer to job in conflict with his religious beliefs found violative of free
exercise rights under strict scrutiny standard); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 410 (state unemploy-
ment eligibility provisions forcing worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting
day of rest struck down under strict scrutiny standard).
10 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). See also City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 111 S. Ct.
1097 (1991) (Court remanded recent case involving neutral landmark preservation statute,
which limited free excercise, for further consideration in light of Smith).
" See Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 663 (1988). When Smith first reached
the Supreme Court, two similar cases from the Oregon Supreme Court were combined
into one case. Id. The two cases raised identical legal issues, presented almost identical
facts, and proceeded in tandem through state administrative proceedings courts until they
were consolidated upon order of the Supreme Court when the state's petitions for certio-
rari were granted. Id. at 663 n.4. The two cases were Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209
Employment Division v. Smith
peyote,21 a controlled substance, 2 at a religious ceremony of the
Native American Church.28 Upon application for unemployment
(1986) and Black v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 221 (1986).
Smith and Black were both employees of the same organization which terminated their
employment under separate but similar circumstances. See Smith, 485 U.S. at 662-63. Black,
who worked for ADAPT, became a drug rehabilitation counselor in June of 1983 and was
terminated from his job in October of 1983 after refusing the employer's offer of inpatient
drug treatment. Black, 301 Or. at 223. Smith, who had counselled alcoholics since 1971
and worked with ADAPT since 1982, was discharged from his job in March of 1984 after
refusing an offer of an employer assistance drug treatment program. Smith, 301 Or. at 211-
12.
21 See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-22, 394 P.2d 813, 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69,
72-74 (1964). The court described the nature of peyote and its role in the Native Ameri-
can Church. Id. at 720-22, 394 P.2d at 816-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-74. Peyote is a halluci-
nogenic drug whose main ingredient is mescaline. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 816, 40 Cal.
Rptr. at 72. It generally causes various degrees of hallucinations, extraordinary vision,
heightened sense of comprehension, and feelings of friendliness. Id. at 720-21, 394 P.2d at
816-17, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73. It plays a central role in the ceremony and practice of the
Native American Church. Id. at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. Members be-
lieve that peyote embodies the Holy Spirit and it constitutes in itself an object of worship.
Id. at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. Ceremonies consist of the sacramental use
of peyote, which, if used for other purposes, is sacrilegious. Id. at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40
Cal. Rptr. at 73.
n See Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-12 (1988). This statute de-
fines controlled substances by classifications of schedules I to V, with schedule I being the
substances most likely to be abused. Id. at §§ 812(a)-(bXIXa). Peyote is listed as a schedule I
controlled substance. Id. at § 812(c)(12). The Act indicates that where state law conflicts
with this statute, the state law will prevail. Id. at § 903. Cf. Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, ORL RE:v. STAT. § 475.005(b) (1987). The state statute defines controlled substances as
drugs or their immediate precursors classified in schedules I through V under the Federal
Controlled Substances Act, 21 US.C. §§ 811 to 812. Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
Oit Rxv. STAT. § 475.005(6X1987). Violations of the state statute are classified as Class A
Felonies. Id. at § 475.992(lXa).
" See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597-98 (1990). Cf. 21 C.F.R. §
1307.31 (1989). The Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice regu-
lated an exception to 21 U.S.C. § 812(cXI2):
The listing of peyote as a controlled substance under Schedule I does not apply to
the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American
Church, and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt
from registration. Any person who manufactures peyote for or distributes peyote to
the Native American Church, however, is required to obtain registration annually
and to comply with all other requirements of law.
Id. See Comment, Brave New World, supra note 2, at 90 1. The author addresses the history
of the exception:
Under the new Drug Abuse Act [21 U.S.C. § § 821, 822(d), 871(b) (1976)], the At-
torney General was authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the control
of drugs. Under that authority, the Drug Enforcement Administration of the De-
partment of Justice concluded that Congress had not intended the 1970 Act to pro-
hibit the use of peyote in religious ceremonies of the Native American Church.
Id.
"As the anthropologists have ascertained through conversations with members, the the-
ology of the church combines certain Christian teachings with the belief that peyote em-
123
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 6: 117, 1990
compensation, Oregon's Employment Division denied benefits to
both respondents at the initial and appellate levels under the ad-
ministrative rules. " In addition, the Employment Division called
for the denial of benefits whenever an employee had been dis-
charged for misconduct connected with employment.2
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed 6 the state's decision
and found that denial of unemployment benefits created a sub-
stantial and unconstitutional burden on the respondents' religion
without the justification of a compelling state interest.2 7 The Su-
bodies the Holy Spirit and that those who partake of peyote enter into direct contact with
God." Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. "[Tjhe Native
American Church ... introduced the use of peyote from Mexico towards the end of the
last century. Church members regard the cactus as both spirit and sacrament, carry it on
their persons, and participate in a communion ceremony in which peyote constitutes the
Host." Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedom for Indigenous Americans, 65 OR. L. REV. 363,
381 (1986).
'" Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 739, 707 P.2d 1274, 1277 (1985). The
court stated that "[tihe Administrative Rule . . . sets out that misconduct is a wilful viola-
tion of the standards of behavior which an employer has the right to expect of an em-
ployee and is an act that amounts to a wilful disregard of the employer's interest." Id.
" Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 211, 721 P.2d 445, 446 (1986). "ADAPT's
written personnel policy, in effect when Smith [and Black were] hired, provides that
'[m]isuse of alcohol and/or other mind altering substances by a staff member' is grounds
for termination." Id. ADAPT also issued a written policy memo after Black's discharge and
before Smith's, stating: "[ADAPT] require[s] the following of [its] employees: 1) Use of an
illegal drug or use of prescription drugs in a non-prescribed manner is grounds for imme-
diate termination from employment .... I Id. at 211-12, 721 P.2d at 446. ADAPT, the
employer, "considers its employees role models for persons they treat" and Oregon law
allows the employer to formulate valid rules of conduct for their employees and apparently
those rules can be enforced during both work and nonwork hours. Black v. Employment
Div., 301 Or. 221, 223, 721 P.2d 451, 452 (1986). "[ADAPT] would have taken the same
action had [Smith and Black] consumed wine at a Catholic ceremony ..... Id.
26 Black, 75 Or. App. at 735, 707 P.2d at 1276; Smith v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App.
764, 709 P.2d 246 (1985).
"7 Black, 75 Or. App. at 741, 707 P.2d at 1278. The court imposed the test first used by
the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963):
The question in this case is whether the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits based on [Black]'s use of peyote in a Native American Church ceremony is
an unconstitutional intrusion on his right to free exercise of religion....
Thus, three separate and distinct issues emerge. (1) Was [Black]'s ingestion of pe-
yote a religious act? (2) Was the denial of benefits a substantial burden? (3) Has the
State demonstrated that the denial of benefits serves a compelling state interest by the
least restrictive means?
Black, 75 Or. App. at 739-40, 707 P.2d at 1277-78 (emphasis in original). The court would
apply the strict scrutiny standard with this test if Black's peyote use was a religious act (this
question was remanded back) and if so then Black's peyote use was protected by "Article I,
sections 2 and 3, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Id. at 740, 721 P.2d at 1277.
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preme Court of Oregon affirmed,2 8 after which the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 Viewing the constitutional
right of free exercise from the perspective of the petitioner
state,30 the Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case
for a determination of whether the sacramental use of peyote was
permissible under Oregon's controlled substance law. 1
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court unanimously reaf-
firmed that the state's interest in this case was in the payment of
unemployment insurance benefits rather than in the criminality of
peyote use.'2 The court, however, concluded that Oregon's drug
" See Smith, 301 Or. at 212-20, 721 P.2d at 446-51. The lower court analyzed both the
state constitutional issue and the federal constitutional issue. Id. The court determined,
under the federal analysis, that Smith was entitled to receive unemployment benefits. Id. at
220, 721 P.2d at 451. "Although we conclude that the state constitution has not been
violated by the denial of benefits ... we find that [Smith] is entitled to prevail under the
federal First Amendment." Id. at 216-17, 721 P.2d at 449. The court found that the Ore-
gon Constitution did not protect Smith since the Oregon unemployment laws were neutral
and did not interfere with "his right to worship according to the dictates of his conscience.
... " Id. at 216, 721 P.2d at 448. However, the court concluded that "[i]n applying the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution], the United
States Supreme Court employs a balancing test that protects religiously motivated actions
as well as religious beliefs." Id. at 217, 721 P.2d at 449. "As in Smith, we hold that denial
of unemployment compensation benefits did not violate Art. I, sections 2 and 3, of the
Oregon Constitution, but did violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution." Black, 301 Or. at 225, 721 P.2d at 453. Further, the court
in each case felt that no remand for determination of the nature of Smith's and Black's
peyote use was necessary since inference could be drawn that the Native American Church
is a recognized religion. Id. at 227, 721 P.2d at 454; Smith, 301 Or. at 220, 721 P.2d at
451.
" Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). "Because we are persuaded that the
alleged illegality of respondents' conduct is relevant to the constitutional analysis, we
granted certiorari . I..." d  at 662.
o See id. at 670. The Court argued in favor of the petitioners' position "that the illegal-
ity of an employee's misconduct is [relevant] to the analysis of the federal constitutional
claim." Id.
11 Id. at 673-74. Free exercise protection afforded to religious belief "does not extend to
conduct that a State has validly proscribed." Id. at 671. "[lf Oregon does prohibit the
religious use of peyote, and if that prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution,
there is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon." Id. at 672. Cf supra note
23 (federal exemption for peyote use in Native American Church).
" See Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 71, 763 P.2d 146, 147 (1988). The court
stated:
[Tihe legality of ingesting peyote does not affect our analysis of the state's inter-
est. The state's interest in denying unemployment benefits to a claimant discharged
for religiously motivated misconduct must be found in the unemployment compensa-
tion statutes, not in the criminal statutes proscribing the use of peyote. The Employ-
ment Division concedes that the 'commission of an illegal act is not, in and of itself,
grounds for disqualification from unemployment benefits.'
Id. (citing Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 219, 721 P.2d 445, 450 (1986)).
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prohibition statute" did not exempt the religious use of peyote,"
and that there was no protection of such religious conduct under
the Oregon Constitution." On certiorari,"6 the Supreme Court
reversed the state court 7 and held that the free exercise clause
permits the state to prohibit religiously inspired use of peyote and
in turn also permits the state to deny unemployment compensa-
tion to persons discharged from their jobs because of such use."
Writing for the Court," Justice Scalia departed from previous
decisions in employment benefit cases where a two-step test, es-
poused in Sherbert v. Verner,'" had been used to balance the bur-
- ORL REV. STAT. §§ 475.005(6), 475.992(4) (1988) (Oregon's definition for controlled
substance and prohibition for possession of controlled substances).
See Smith, 307 Or. at 72-73, 763 P.2d at 148. "We conclude that the Oregon statute
against possession of controlled substances, which include peyote, makes no exception for
the sacramental use of peyote, but that outright prohibition of good faith religious use of
peyote by adult members of the Native American Church would violate the First Amend-
ment directly ..... Id. Cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1618 n.5 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). justice Blackmun noted that even the Federal government has
exempted the religious use of peyote from its controlled drug law. Id. The Justice also
emphasized that 23 states have statutory or judicially crafted exemptions in their drug laws
for the religious use of peyote. Id. See supra note 23 (federal drug law exempting religious
use of peyote).
" See Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 664 n.8 (1988) (quoting Oxt. CoNsT. art.
I, §§ 2, 3). The Oregon Constitution states in pertinent part:
Section 2. Freedom of worship. All men shall be secure in the Natural right, to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
Section 3. Freedom of religious opinion. No law shall in any case whatever control
the free exercise, and enjoyment of religeous [sic] opinions, or interfere with the
rights of conscience.
Id. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that these state constitutional provisions did not
protect the conduct of ingesting peyote during religious ceremonies. See Smith v. Employ-
ment Div., 301 Or. 209, 216, 721 P.2d 445, 449 (1986).
' Smith, I 10 S. Ct. at 1595.
Id. at 1606.
-Id.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597 (1990). justice Scalia was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Id. Justice O'Connor
wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. Justice Blackmun wrote the dis-
sent, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id.
374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, appellant was fired from her job because she could
not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. Id. at 401. She was denied unemploy-
ment compensation as a result of her "conscientious objection to Saturday work." Id. at
403. Appellant contended that the state statute disqualifying her from benefits violated her
free exercise rights. Id. at 401. The Court's decision on this constitutional matter rested on
a two-prong analysis: 1) whether the denial of benefits or the restriction on conduct im-
posed by valid state regulation was a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion,
and 2) whether any incidental burden on the free exercise of religion was justified by a
compelling state interest. Id. at 403. The analysis concluded that the regulation was a bur-
den on the free exercise of the appellant's religion and the state's interest in providing
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den on the individual's free exercise of religion with the state's
compelling interests through a strict scrutiny standard.' In an ef-
fort to justify the majority's departure from Sherbert's strict scru-
tiny standard,41 Justice Scalia juxtaposed this case with previous
unemployment compensation cases4" and held that the test was in-
applicable to challenges involving across-the-board, religion-neu-
tral criminal prohibitions."' Justice Scalia asserted that "[t]o make
an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the
law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
State's interest is 'compelling' . . . contradicts both constitutional
tradition and common sense.""' He reasoned that applying the
test would enforce a private right to ignore generally applicable
laws and that this, in itself, was a "constitutional anomaly." 46 Fur-
thermore, Justice Scalia stated that the Sherbert balancing test was
created for the purpose of individualizing governmental assess-
ment of the reasons for a person's termination from employ-
ment,'4 and not to invalidate "an across-the-board criminal prohi-
bition on a particular form of conduct." 46
funds to those involuntarily unemployed would not be undermined by granting the reli-
gious exemption. Id. at 40-09. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (added
another step to Sherbert test by requiring that "claims must be rooted in religious belief").
" See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
The Court required a strict scrutiny standard to compel the state to show their overriding
interest before persons could be denied unemployment compensation benefits when forced
to choose between their legitimate religious beliefs and continued employment. Id. See
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana, 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981) ("state may justify an in-
road on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest" within employment benefit context); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406
(strict scrutiny standard used to evaluate infringement on first amendment right within
employment context).
"1 See supra note 41 (strict scrutiny is generally adhered to in cases involving employment
benefits and free exercise rights).
4s Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602. "[T~he conduct at issue in [Hobbie, Thomas, and Sherbert] was
not prohibited by law." Id. at 1598. Contra Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-08. The respondents
were convicted of violating a criminal prohibition, yet the Court exempted the respondents
under the Sherbert test from conforming with this law in favor of their religious convic-
tions. Id. at 208. Generally, the Sherbert test is applied where respondents are forced to
choose between criminal liability and their religious practices. Id. at 213-15.
"See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603. "(T]he sounder approach ... is to hold the [Sherbert) test
inapplicable to [criminal law) challenges." Id.
"Id.
" Id. at 1604.
47 See id. at 1603.
" Id.
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Where the previous employment cases" had addressed the com-
pelling interest of the state to pay unemployment benefits, Justice
Scalia centered his free exercise review on the state's sovereign 0
right to impose universal criminal sanctions and other neutral reg-
ulations even where those laws may impact negatively on the abil-
ity to engage in some prescribed religious conduct.51 Justice Scalia
defined the free exercise clause as being limited by an individual's
obligation to obey any "valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility' 5 2 even if it is contrary to the person's religious beliefs.5 3
While stating that the state's sovereign rights include exempting
certain conduct from criminal sanctions to avoid interference with
religious practice, Justice Scalia added that the state was not con-
stitutionally compelled to take such action."
Both Justice O'Connor's sharp concurring opinion"8 and Justice
"See supra note 41 (employment benefit cases cited).
* See U.S. Cossr. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." Id. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." US.
CoNsr. amend. XI. See also Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1491-
1520 (1987). The theory of sovereignty is embodied in the Constitution's tenth amend-
ment, which affirms the sovereignty of the people, not of the state governments. Id. at
1492. This amendment affirms that governments have no sovereign right to violate the
Constitution. Id.
0' Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600. "We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State
is free to regulate." Id.
-Id.
' Id. Justice Scalia relied on prior precedent and compared Smith to previous caselaw,
arguing that free exercise is limited by generally applicable, neutral laws. Id. Justice Scalia
relied primarily on Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) to
support his argument, although this case was reversed by West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Id. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)
(compelling state interest in administrating social security tax was not unconstitutional bur-
den on religion); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (military selective
service system was upheld against claim of free exercise violation); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (where state has power to regulate conduct by generally applied law,
that law is valid even though it burdens religious conduct); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944) (state labor law prohibiting minors from distributing periodicals in public
upheld over first amendment free exercise claim); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
166 (1878) (state has power to regulate conduct through valid neutral laws).
" Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606. "[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemp-
tion is permitted, or... desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that
the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts." Id.
s Id. at 1607 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "To reach this sweeping result .. . the Court
must not only give a strained reading of the First Amendment but must also disregard our
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Blackmun's strong dissent focused on the majority's departure
from established case law." Consistent with the strict scrutiny
standard developed in the previous case law, Justice O'Connor
and the dissenting Justices favored application of the Sherbert bal-
ancing test." Unlike the majority, the concurrence and the dis-
sent argued for the application of the Sherbert balancing test to
any statute," whether directly prohibiting religious conduct or
conditioning receipt of a benefit on behavior forbidden by reli-
gious doctrine." Justice O'Connor's argument differed from the
dissent in determining where the state's interests lie.60
Justice O'Connor reasoned that a strict scrutiny analysis was re-
quired in light of the burden that neutral and generally applicable
laws pose on an individual's free exercise rights.61 Applying the
Sherbert balancing test, Justice O'Connor concluded that a reli-
gious exemption of peyote would be incompatible with the state's
compelling interest in regulating use and possession of controlled
substances," and would unreasonably interfere with the govern-
consistent application of free exercise doctrine to cases involving generally applicable regu-
lations that burden religious conduct." Id.
"Id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissenting Justices joined J. O'Connor in parts I
and II of her concurring opinion).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1609-11 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Justice O'Connor suggested a case-by-case approach to the balancing test which re-
quired a determination of whether the burden on the specific plaintiff was constitutionally
significant and whether the particular criminal interest asserted by the state was compel-
ling. Id. Justice Blackmun weighed the respondents' clear interest in the free exercise of
religion against Oregon's asserted interest in enforcing its drug laws. Id. at 1616-17, 1622
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Unlike Justice O'Connor, he found that the state's interest was
not "sufficiently compelling" to outweigh the burden on respondents' free exercise of reli-
gion. Id.
" Id. at 1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The First Amendment.. . does not distin-
guish between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious
practices." Id. "[Justice Blackmun] agrees] with Justice O'Connor's analysis of the applica-
ble free exercise doctrine, and... join(s] parts I and II of her opinion." Id. at 1616 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1610 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" Compare id. at 1614 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[U]niform application of Oregon's
criminal prohibition is 'essential to accomplish' .. . its overriding interest in preventing the
physical harm caused by the use of a Schedule I controlled substance.") (citations omitted)
with Id. at 1617-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissent found no overriding state interest due
to lack of any evidence showing danger to public health and safety both from peyote use
and from almost nonexistent trafficking of peyote).
" See supra note 57 (Justice O'Connor's application of Sherbert strict scrutiny test
discussed).
" Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1615 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ment's interests."
Justice Blackmun's dissent countered the concurrence's conclu-
sion and labeled the state's interest in preventing a flood of fraud-
ulent claims as "purely speculative."" Seeing only a narrow state
interest which they defined as the refusal to grant "exception for
the religious, ceremonial use of peyote," 66 the dissent concluded
that such interests do not outweigh the burden on the individual's
free exercise of religion."
In view of the broad history involving first amendment free ex-
ercise law,67 as well as the established employment-free exercise
case law," it is submitted that the Smith majority would have con-
ciliated previous case law while solidifying their position if they
had approached their decision in one of two ways. The Court
could have either properly distinguished Smith from the employ-
ment cases to exclude this religious conduct from first amendment
protection or consistently applied the Sherbert strict scrutiny stan-
dard in line with the previous case law.
This Comment will offer a historical perspective of the inconsis-
tencies in the interpretation and application of first amendment
free exercise law as a whole. It will analyze the use of the strict
scrutiny standard of review in free exercise cases and the histori-
cal trends evidenced by the judiciary's decisions. In addition, this
Comment will address the consistent use of the strict scrutiny stan-
" Id. at 1615 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
" See id. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Almost half the States, and the Federal
Government, have maintained an exemption for religious peyote use for many years, and
apparently have not found themselves overwhelmed by claims to other religious exemp-
tions." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 394
P.2d 813, 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74-75 (1964). The state contended that "the threat of
fraudulent assertions of religious immunity will render impossible the effective enforce-
ment of the narcotics laws .... " Id. However, the court, citing Sherbert determined that
"there [was] no proof whatever to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit ... Id.;
Comment, Brave New World, supra note 2, at 886. "Speculative fears of fraudulent religious
claims [do] not constitute a compelling interest." Id. But see State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont.
219, 223, 243 P. 1067, 1073 (1926). The court feared that if they made a religious excep-
tion for the use of peyote by the Native American Church then "the use of opium, cocaine,
and even 'moonshine' might be justified under the guise of religious observance." Id.
" Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1617.
" See id. at 1622-23.
e" See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (history of major cases effecting free exer-
cise clause).
See supra note 41 (demonstrating established case history extending first amendment
rights to state unemployment compensation practices).
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dard in cases involving conflicts between religion and employment
regulations. This Comment will focus on the move away from the
strict scrutiny standard in Smith, which served to weaken the first
amendment free exercise clause. Lastly, this Comment will suggest
a need to adhere to the strict scrutiny standard in cases involving
such a fundamental liberty.
I. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Prior to Sherbert and its progeny, the Court arbitrarily ap-
proached' infringements on the first amendment's free exercise
clause by enabling legislatures to control religious conduct in any
manner, as long as it did not directly infringe on religious belief.70
This arbitrary approach was evident in Reynolds v. United States 1
and Davis v. Beason,'2 both of which held that the religious prac-
tice of polygamy in the Mormon faith was against the morals of
society and should not be excused because it was grounded in a
particular religious belief.'8 The effect of this approach was to
grossly limit the free exercise of all but the most mainstream reli-
gions' 4 for more than half a century.' 5
* See infra notes 71-73 (cases denoting application of discretionary standard of review).
See also Taisa. supra note 7, at 1271. In his discussion on Reynolds, Professor Tribe de-
scribed the state's interest in preserving monogamous marriages and the exploitation of
women as "amorphous goals [which] serve to mask religious persecution." Id. He stated
that the "government should [not] be able to use such an amorphous purpose to force its
views upon those who do not share them ...." Id. It is submitted that such amorphous
goals resulted in an arbitrary standard of review. Prior to Sherbert, "even demonstrable
infringements upon the free exercise of religion were not subjected to a constitutionally
stringent standard of review." Comment, Brave New World, supra note 2, at 879, 882.
'* See supra note 6 (Reynolds Court established legislatures' ability to restrict religious
conduct through generally applicable laws).
T 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
" 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
"See id. at 341-42. In Davis, Justice Field discussed the criminal nature of polygamy and
bigamy and concluded that exempting such crimes from punishment would shock the
moral judgment of the community. Id. He further contended that the first amendment
does not protect religious acts which are subversive to peace, good order, and the morals
of society. Id. The Reynolds Court has also stated that the first amendment was not in-
tended to prohibit legislation which reached actions in violation of social duties. Reynolds,
98 U.S. at 164-65. Thus, the social importance of marriage required that it be regulated by
law. Id.
"1 See Lupu, supra note 2, at 938. "Reynolds' belief-action distinction thus reduced the
free exercise clause to a primarily rhetorical commitment to protecting religious liberty."
Id.; Comment, Brave New World, supra note 2, at 882. "As long as legislative regulation
concerned only behavior and lay within the legitimate exercise of the police power, even
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Reynolds left religious conduct exposed to indirect burdens from
a wide variety of governmental regulations. 7' Gradually, the
Court moved toward accommodating a wider range of religious
practices. 7 Starting with Cantwell v. Connecticut,78 the Court began
to distinguish direct and indirect burdens on religious conduct1 '
and recognized that the free exercise of religion could not be un-
justifiably limited." Cantwell and subsequent cases formulated a
precursor to the strict scrutiny standard,8 1 advocating that reli-
demonstrable infringements upon the free exercise of religion were not subjected to consti-
tutionally stringent standards of scrutiny." Id.
7s See Lupu, supra note 2, at 939 ("Reynwlds survived for almost a century."); Comment,
Brave New World, supra note 2, at 882 ("This distinction between protected belief and
regulable practice persisted for the next fifty years-despite the fact that it effectively evis-
cerated the freedom to 'exercise' religion anywhere except within the confines of the
mind.").
" See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). The Braunfeld Court stated:
[Ihf the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the pur-
pose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish
its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.
Id. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (reaffirmed Reynolds' holding
that religious conduct remains subject to government regulation); Lupu, sufpra note 2, at
938. "A wide variety of general government practices and policies might cause harm to
religion, by making it more expensive, difficult, or dangerous." Id. However, as long as
these government practices and policies "remained on the action side of the belief-action
dichotomy," the Court would uphold them over an individual's first amendment free exer-
cise rights. Id.
" See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. "In every case the power to regulate must be so exer-
cised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Id.
With the Cantwell decision, "the Supreme Court began a slow process of requiring the state
increasingly to 'accommodate' the demands of religious practice." Comment, Brave Nm
World, supra note 2, at 833. Although the state remained free to regulate religious con-
duct, the means utilized could not unduly burden religious practices. Id.
8 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
"See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. The Court distinguished between legislation which di-
rectly and wholly prohibits religious conduct of a particular religion and legislation which
is general, non-discriminatory and for the purpose of regulating time, place and manner of
certain conduct. Id. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606-07 (Court distinguished between legisla-
tion regulating conduct which imposes solely indirect burden on observance of religion and
that which produces direct burden).
" Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304 (Court specified that legislation cannot unduly infringe free
exercise of religion).
" See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307.
We must determine whether the alleged protection of the State's interest, means to
which end would, in the absence of limitation by the federal Constitution, lie wholly
within the State's discretion, has been pressed, . . . to a point where it has come into
fatal collision with the overriding interests protected by the federal compact.
Id. If the effect or purpose of a law is to impede the free exercise of a religion, or to
discriminate between religions, then that law is unconstitutional, even though the burden is
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gious conduct will prevail where an "infringement was 'unduly'
burdensome in relation to the legitimate state end," 2 while at the
same time being too ambiguous to provide an express guideline
for protecting free exercise rights.83 By continuing to focus on the
means rather than the ends, these cases, while upholding legiti-
mate state concerns involving public morals, continued to arbi-
trarily and inconsistently limit religious conduct."
The legacy of Reynolds and Cantwell was overturned with the
threshold decision of Sherbert, which no longer focused on the re-
ligious belief-action distinction, but rather, focused on an ends-
oriented analysis of religious interest versus state interest.88 The
Sherbert test offered a strict scrutiny standard which weighed these
interests, but failed to furnish explicit rules for subsequent courts
to apply in deciding whether a burden on free exercise exists."
Consequently, the elements of the test have multiplied"7 as courts
began expanding the focus of their questioning to include the
only indirect. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607. As for laws which are within the states's
power to enact and which serve a secular goal, the laws are constitutional despite any indi-
rect burdens on religious freedom, "unless the state may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden." Id. The Court held that "interests which the State
may lawfully protect [must be in] grave and immediate danger [before imposing burdens
on free exercise rights]." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943). See Lupu, supra note 2, at 940. "Braunfeld's approach represents a dramatic depar-
ture from Reynolds, ... significantly widen[ing] the [free exercise] clause's potential scope
by both including indirect harms to religion and increasing the state's difficulty in satisfying
the standard of review." Id.
- Comment, Brave New World, supra note 2, at 883.
' See supra notes 76, 77 and 81 (ambiguously stated standards of review in Cantwell and
Braunfeld). See also Lupu, supra note 2, at 942 (emphasis on standard set forth in Braunfeld
and Sherbert and Court's failure to instruct on consistent application of standard).
"B See Comment, Brave New World, sura note 2, at 885. "Braunfeld makes it clear that
scrutiny of state infringements on religious practice has bite only when it focuses not on
means but on ends." Id.
" See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963). The Court, focusing upon pur-
poses of religious and state interests, distinguished between religiously motivated conduct
within the scope of government regulation, i.e., conduct which "pose[s] some substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order" and conduct "prompted by religious principles of a
kind [not] within the reach of state legislation." Id. The Court then engaged in a two-step
analysis. See supra note 40. "The shift from means-oriented to ends-oriented scrutiny took
place in Sherbert v. Verner... and has since been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in other
cases as well." Comment, Brave New World, supra note 2, at 885-86.
B' Lupu, supra note 2, at 942.
' See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (identifying various new elements and
analyses applied by Supreme Court, adding to core burden-compelling interest test).
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sincerity of the individual," the sincerity of the religion,8 the
centrality of the religious act in question,90 whether the burden
- See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). "Courts should not undertake
to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is 'struggling' with his posi-
tion or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more
sophisticated person might employ." Id.; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). To
evaluate whether Amish religious beliefs were sincere, Court had to determine that their
faith and their mode of life were "inseparable and interdependent." Id. See, e.g., People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 723-24, 394 P.2d 813, 820-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76-77 (1964)
(factual examination to determine whether defendant's belief in peyotism is honest, genu-
ine and in good faith requires investigating nature of defendant's adherence to religious
belief in question).
In determining whether claimant's use of peyote was a genuine religious act, the follow-
ing questions had to be asked: "(1) [Was] the ingestion of peyote a sacrament of the Native
American Church? (2) [Was] this claimant a member of that church? (3) [W]ere claimant's
religious beliefs sincerely held?" See Black v. Employment Div., 75 Or. App. 735, 743, 707
P.2d 1274, 1279-80 (1985). See also Lupu, supra note 2, at 954-55. Professor Lupu analyzes
the Court's application of the sincerity standard:
[S]incerity requires a demonstration of heart-felt commitment.. . [It is] evaluated
on the basis of extrinsic and objective evidence concerning the claimant's actions,
statements and demeanor .... [A] finding of insincerity would presumably make
decisionmakers quite comfortable with rejecting a free exercise claim; such a finding
would mark the claimant as one who fraudulently invokes religion and the Constitu-
tion in order to further some form of nonreligious self-interest.
Id.
" See Lupu, supra note 2, at 956-58. Professor Lupu addressed religiosity, the sincerity
of religion, and observed that there is no consensus as to what constitutes religious belief.
Id. at 957. Since it is difficult to ascertain what is and what is not religion, the courts tend
to question whether defendant's beliefs are sincere, as opposed to whether the institution
she worships, as a whole, is sincere. Id. See also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. In determining the
sincerity of religion, the majority asserted:
Intrafaith differences... are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed,
and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in rela-
tion to the Religion Clauses .... [Tihe guarantee of free exercise is not limited to
beliefs which are shared by all members of a religious sect . . . . Courts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretations. The narrow function of a reviewing court...
is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated
his work because of an honest conviction that [it] was forbidden by his religion.
Id.; Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 724, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77. "[Tlhe court makes a
factual determination of the bona fides of the belief and does not intrude into the religious
issue at all; it does not determine the nature of the belief but the nature of the defendant's
adherence to it." Id.
' See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (1990). Justice Scalia discussed
the notion of centrality and concluded that it was not for the Court to determine whether
the conduct prohibited was central to the individual's religion. Id. He noted that "it is not
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.
... . Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2149. (1989)). Cf Woody,
61 Cal. 2d at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73. The Supreme Court of California
determined that peyote played a central role in the ceremony and practices of the Native
American Church. Id. The court compared the religious use of peyote to the practice of
polygamy by Mormons and decided that "[p]olygamy ... is not essential to the practice of
the religion; peyote, on the other hand, is the sine qua non of [the Native American
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was indirect or incidental, 1 whether individuals were coerced into
choosing between their religion and the law,"2 and whether the
law penalized the individual in some way."3 Despite the lack of ex-
press guidance," the Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded
Sherbert in subsequent cases where religious conduct conflicted
with state employment regulations." In contrast, the Court has
unaccountably refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard in re-
cent cases involving direct conflicts between religious practices
and state interest." This erratic history and the current diver-
Church]." Id. at 723, 394 P.2d at 820, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 76. The court's determination
concerning the centrality of peyote played a key role in the outcome of the case. Id. at 724,
394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77. See generally Comment, Brave New World, supra note
2, at 925 (because determining centrality is almost as difficult as determining religiosity,
courts are often reluctant to inquire into centrality of religious practice).
" See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439, 465 (1988)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, rejected the Court's ar-
gument that "the First Amendment bars only outright prohibitions, indirect coercion, and
penalties on the free exercise of religion," and that "all other 'incidental effects of govern-
ment programs' . . . do not give rise to constitutional concerns." Id. The dissent main-
tained instead that it is well established that protections of the guarantee are not solely
limited to such governmental burdens. Id. "A governmental burden on religious liberty is
not insulated from review simply because it is indirect." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706
(1986). The Court has contended that "[t~o strike down, without the most critical scrutiny,
legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion ... would
radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature." Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 606 (1961). The Court concluded that the Sunday Closing Law in question was valid
because the need for a uniform day of rest was tantamount to the indirect financial burden
on the Orthodox Jews who chose to adhere to their Sabbath. Id. at 608-09.
" See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 140-44
(1987) (unlawful coercion exists when individual is forced to choose between adherence to
religious belief and continued employment); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 (burden on reli-
gion exists when individual is pressured into choosing between receiving important benefit
and adhering to religious beliefs).
" See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449 (if government action penalizes religious activity by
denying any person benefits/privileges enjoyed by others, burden on religion exists); Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("[T]o condition the availability of benefits upon
. ..appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively
penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.").
" See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text (Court has not instructed on uniform
usage and application of additional elements); Lupu, supra note 2, at 946. "Substantial
questions concerning the scope of religious freedom are thus at stake in the content sup-
plied by courts to the concept of burden." Id.
" See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 136, 138 (violation of free exercise clause where Sabbath ob-
servance conflicted with availability of unemployment benefits under state law); Thomas,
450 U.S. at 707, 717-18 (state employment law preventing former employee from collect-
ing unemployment compensation after he quit due to religious beliefs prohibited by first
amendment).
us See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51 (Court ignored burden on religion in favor of gov-
ernment's ownership rights); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1986) (Court ignored
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gence from the Sherbert standard set the stage for the inconsis-
tent rationale in Smith.'
II. VAGUENESS AND INCONSISTENCY IN THE SMITH APPROACH
Departing from established first amendment jurisprudence, the
Smith Court left a vague and inconsistent framework, not only
when deciding free exercise cases in employment, but also in re-
gard to any facially neutral statute which may inhibit a person's
free exercise of religion." This inconsistency and vagueness ap-
peared not only when the Court disregarded any precedent for
invalidating neutral state law which burdens religious conduct,"
but also when it distinguished as "hybrids" those cases which have
invalidated such state laws.1" Furthermore, even if the Court
clearly distinguished Smith from the hybrid cases, it is suggested
that this should not have precluded the need to carefully deter-
burden on religious belief in favor of government's interest in preventing fraud in entitle-
ment program).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602-03 (1990) (Smith departed from
established strict scrutiny standard in employment cases).
" See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1611-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated
that "[gliven the range of conduct that a State might legitimately make criminal, we cannot
assume, merely because a law carries criminal sanctions and is generally applicable, that the
First Amendment never requires the State to grant a limited exemption for religiously mo-
tivated conduct .... I d. at 1611 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). She
further stated that "[tlhere is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability
or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to
violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws
aimed at religion." Id. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" Id. at 1600. The Court cited as authority Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); yet it failed to distinguish the 1972 prece-
dent of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600. Yoder represents
an example of the Court using the strict scrutiny standard to hold that the state did not
have a compelling interest in withholding an exception to the state's school attendance law
to relieve a religious burden. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 228-29. The Amish had been convicted
and criminal sanctions had been imposed under the criminal provisions of the statute. Id. at
205.
I See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02. The Court called "hybrids" those "decisions in
which [they] have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action . . . involv[ing] not the Free Exercise Clause
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,...
." Id. at 1601. Listed among these hybrid exceptions is Yoder with the explanation that the
case involved "the right of parents to direct the education of their children." Id. Smith, like
Yoder, involved free exercise burdens under general criminal laws. Id. However, the Court
offers no explanation as to why it factors parental rights as the catalyst for a strict scrutiny
standard to protect first amendment free exercise rights. Id.
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mine the scope of first amendment rights as against state
interests."'
Similarly, it is submitted that the Court's reasoning for dis-
missing the strong precedent in the employment cases was
flawed. 102 The Court did not distinguish those cases from Smith,
but simply dismissed Smith as a case concerning a criminal statute
instead of employment benefits.'" The well established law in this
area not only affirmed free exercise rights where work require-
ment and religious practices conflicted, but also extended those
rights to cases where the employee was aware before hire of the
work conditions and where the employee converted to the reli-
gion after employment began.' The Smith Court added to the
nebulous nature of this decision by reaching a conclusion without
distinguishing pertinent case law.' 0 '
Vagueness and inconsistency were also evident where the Smith
Court made comparisons with other cases concerning challenges
to burdens of free exercise.'" The comparisons pointed only gen-
101 See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). The need to
delineate and protect minority rights is evident in Justice Jackson's reiteration of the pur-
pose of the Bill of Rights in Barnette, which noted that:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicis-
situdes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote, they de-
pend on the outcome of no elections.
Id.
Jo See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602-03 (1990). The reasoning of
the Court was that the employment cases "involved unemployment compensation rules that
conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant's willingness to work under condi-
tions forbidden by his religion." Id. The Court's explanation would seem to include, not
exclude Smith. Id. at 1602. However, the Court earlier drew the conclusion that Smith in-
volved a criminal statute, not a work rule. Id. at 1598. Cf supra note 100 (discussing hybrid
cases).
I ld. at 1598. "[I]n [Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie] we held that a State could not condi-
tion the availability of unemployment insurance on an individual's willingness to forego
conduct required by his religion. As we observed in Smith 1, however, the conduct at issue
in those cases was not prohibited by law." Id.
1O" See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 143-44
(1987). Like Smith, the employee was aware of the employer's work rules before employ-
ment began. Id.
'e" See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1616 (Blackmum, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, with agree-
ment from Justices Brennan and Marshall, concluded that the majority opinion was based
on a "distorted view of our precedents .... " Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 1602-03. Comparisons were made to Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
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erally to the rejection of the Sherbert analysis in each instance 10 7
and did not articulate distinctive similarities. For example, the
Court's conclusion that they had never applied the Sherbert test to
invalidate a criminal statute1 directly contradicts the holding in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, which did, in fact, invalidate a criminal stat-
ute.1 In addition, their rejection of the test's compelling govern-
ment interest analysis was inconsistent with established standards
for first amendment interpretations in that it diverted from the
strong precedent set forth in previous employment cases. 110
The risk posed by this unclear analysis is that the Smith decision
will be generally applied by future courts, thereby limiting the
rights guaranteed by the free exercise clause.1 1 Further risk exists
Assoc., 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). Id. at 1602. The
Court's sparse comparison pointed to state sovereignty issues: 1) the states' authority to
regulate socially harmful conduct, 2) the states' ability to accommodate individual exemp-
tions in the unemployment benefit system, and 3) the unfair burden on the states created
by the compelling interests test. Id. at 1603-04. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opin-
ion, argued that the Court should have addressed the first amendment implications of the
Oregon statute in order to determine the constitutional mandates of free exercise. Id. at
1608 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'0 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990). The conclusion of the
Court's comparison of Lyng and Roy with Smith was that "the government's ability to en-
force generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry
out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a govern-
mental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.'" Id. (quoting Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
U See id. at 1603.
406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). The ruling relieved the Amish from suffering criminal
penalty for following their religious practices. Id. In her concurring opinion in Smith, Jus-
tice O'Connor cited Cantwell and Yoder to confirm that the Court had in fact interpreted
the Free Exercise Clause to prohibit application of neutral statutes to religiously motivated
conduct. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1609 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also supra notes 43 &
99 (discussion of holding in Yoder: constitutional protections of religious convictions held
by Amish overruled state criminal statute requiring compulsory school attendance).
I" See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that
it was unnecessary for the Court to misread settled first amendment precedents when they
could have reached the same result by applying established case law. Id. The most recent
reaffirmation of the compelling interest standard in first amendment free exercise cases is
evidenced by the Court's decision in Hobbie v. Unemployment App. Comm'n of Fla., 480
U.S. 136 (1987), which rejected all other standards other than strict scrutiny. Comment,
First Americans, supra note 4, at 952-53. "It is important to note that the Court took pains
to reaffirm Sherbert, Thomas, and Yoder in reaching the Hobbie decision .... " Id. Further-
more, "the Court expressly rejected the Roy reasoning." Id. at 953. The Court in Smith
rejected Hobbie's strong affirmation of first amendment principles without using the Sherbert
test. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1602. This, it is submitted, created a new standard, but what
that standard is, is unclear.
"' See supra notes 105-06, 109-10 (concurring and dissenting justices' conclusion that
majority's rationale misapplied relevant case law).
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if inconsistent and unequal application of the free exercise clause
results at the state level due to variable state laws which may bur-
den or may except from burden1 2 any religious conduct, as long
as the statute is neutral and generally applicable. Utilizing previ-
ous case law standards would not have been disruptive to first
amendment rights. 1 The Court's failure to recognize these risks
and to reconcile previous case law may have been motivated by
the national drug problem,11' their misunderstanding of Native
American religions' or the desire to strengthen the states' sov-
ereign rights."' Whatever the motivation, it is suggested that the
I's See Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 72 n.2 (1988). The court inferred that
there is no uniform standard of free exercise in the state constitutions, statutes or their
application. See id. The states also differ on tolerance of peyote use in Native American
Church worship: "At least 11 states exempt sacramental peyote from criminal proscription
* . . [while] at least 12 other states link their exemptions to those under federal law." Id.
(citations omitted). See also supra note 34 (justice Blackmun's discussion on exemption for
religious use of peyote). Cf Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210,
1218 (5th Cir. 1991). The court underscored the state's right to enforce drug control laws
unencumbered by first amendment free excercise considerations, listing three options,
"per Smith, [to] refuse all exemptions, exempt only NAC members, or exempt all bona fide
religious peyote use." Id.
'" See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1607 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
[T]he Court holds that where the law is a generally applicable criminal prohibition,
our usual free exercise jurisprudence does not even apply. To reach this sweeping
result, however, the Court must not only give a strained reading of the First Amend-
ment but must also disregard our consistent application of free exercise doctrine to
cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious conduct.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"I Id. at 1614 (O'Connor, J. concurring). In her concurring opinion, justice O'Connor
addressed the national drug problem and the state's legitimate concern with drug abuse
and drug trafficking. Id. She determined that uniform application of Oregon's criminal
prohibition was essential in light of the deleterious health effects caused by the use of con-
trolled substances and the societal interest in preventing trafficking in controlled sub-
stances. Id. Therefore, the state's interest in alleviating the national drug problem far out-
weighed the religiously motivated use of such controlled substances. Id. justice Blackmun,
in his dissenting opinion, countered justice O'Connor's 'war on drugs' argument, relying
on precedents in jurisdictions having statutory exemptions for the religious use of peyote
where no increased drug problems resulted. Id. at 1618 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"I See Comment, First Americans, supra note 4, at 953, 967. The author noted that "con-
tradictory holdings apparently result from a misunderstanding of Native American reli-
gion." Id. at 953. He further observed that the "increased burden that Native Americans
face regarding sacred sites apparently results from the same problems that hinder peyote
worship: Judeo.Christians simply don't understand Indian religions." Id. at 967.
1" See Althouse, The Federalist Five, 76 KBA. J. 46 (1990). "Generally, when state inter-
ests conflict with an individual citizen's claim of a federal right, a solid five-member major-
ity, consisting of Chief justice Rehnquist and justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Ken-
nedy leans heavily in favor of the state." Id.
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first amendment's free exercise rights have been weakened as a
result.
III. THE NEED FOR ACROSS THE BOARD LEGISLATION
Although the legislature has not addressed freedom of religion
as a whole, it has attempted to protect the American Indian's free-
dom of religion by enacting the American Indian Religious Free-
dom Act [hereinafter AIRFA]." 7 AIRFA appeared meaningful on
its surface, but it was cast aside by the judiciary as applying only to
federal administrative agencies."' Legislatures have also generally
upheld protection from discrimination in employment on the basis
of religion through such acts as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964"9 and state labor laws.' Nonetheless, there is a definite
need for across-the-board legislation."2" It is suggested that one
way to reach a consensus is for the legislature to recognize the
' Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)). AIRFA
reads:
[lI]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the tradi-
tional religions of the American Indian .. . including but not limited to access to
sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through cere-
monials and traditional rites.
Id.; H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). "Native Americans have an
inherent right to the free exercise of their religion." Id.
"I8 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). According to the House
Report, the purpose of AIRFA was "to insure that the policies and procedures of various
Federal agencies, as they may impact upon the exercise of traditional Indian religious prac-
tices, are brought into compliance with the constitutional injunction that Congress shall
make no laws abridging the free exercise of religion." Id. See generally Note, The First
Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: An Approach to Protecting Native
American Religion, 71 IOWA L. Rav. 869, 873 (1986). "[Cjourts have interpreted AIRFA
merely as a directive to administrative agencies to safeguard Indian religious rights ...
which severely limits the protection Congress intended to provide .... " id.
its 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). This act protects employees from discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of religion via a definition stating: "The term 'religion' includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demon-
strates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective em-
ployee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business." Id. at § 2000eo).
I" See, e.g., Underkuffler, supra note 2, at 589-90. "Federal, state, and local statutes and
ordinances, as well as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution, have long afforded employees protection against discrimination
on the basis of religion." Id.
n' See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990). Justice Scalia addressed
the need for across the board application of laws and standards. Id. It is suggested that such
across the board application should also extend to free exercise legislation as a whole.
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need for uniform guidelines regarding first amendment
interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has returned to a plain meaning construc-
tion of the free exercise clause. Consequently, non-mainstream re-
ligions have suffered. Smith and other recent decisions have been
insensitive to the plight of non-popular religious sects, drastically
impeding their ability to practice their religion, possibly even de-
stroying them.
This trend must be reversed quickly to preserve both minority
religions and the intent of the Constitution's framers. A strict
scrutiny standard is essential to such preservation of rights. The
Bill of Rights should not be narrowed in favor of states' sovereign
rights without first providing a careful balancing analysis. At the
same time, uniform application of the strict scrutiny standard is
also imperative to fairly and equitably preserve first amendment
rights for all citizens both inside and outside the mainstream.
Only through such a consistent and uniform approach can the
heritage of native peoples as well as the fundamental free exercise
liberties of the first amendment be preserved.
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